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A SURVEY OF CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES

ARISING FROM CONTRACTS FOR
COMPUTER GOODS AND

SERVICES
By Larry W. Smith*

INTRODUCTION
By the end of 1980, it is estimated that there will be as many as
one million computers in use in the United States.' Viewed once as
merely a tool for large bureaucracies such as the census bureauwith a market estimated at only a few machines 2-- the computer today has obviously "come of age" in the business community, where
over $50 billion will be spent for computer-related goods and services in 1979.3
Although the enormous size of this industry is enough to indicate the number and variety of problems likely to be encountered in
contracting for the myriad of available goods and services, the
problems are aggravated by the fact that the industry has been in
existence for less than thirty years. 4 It should, therefore, come as
*

B.A. 1968, Bus. Admin., Wichita State University- J.D. 1979, Southwestern Uni-
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1. Included in this figure are 250,000 conventional computers (those costing over
$50,000) and 750,000 minicomputers. There will also be another ten million
microprocessors, many of which can be programmed. Minicomputers Challenge the
Big Machines, Bus. WEEK, Apr. 26, 1976, at 58, 59; Dorfman, Move Over, Horatio Alger,
ESQUIRE, June 6, 1978, at 9, 9-11; Information Processing, FORBES, Jan. 8, 1979, at 230,
234; Business: Thinking Small, TIME, Feb. 20, 1978, at 50, 51-58; Davis, Evolution of
Computers, SCIENCE, Mar. 18, 1978, at 1096, 1099.
2. E. ToMEsKi, THE COMPTrER REVOLUTION 17-18 (1970).

3. W. Fuom, INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPUTER 42 (2d ed. 1977); Minicomputers
Challenge the Big Machines, supra note 1, at 58-63; Davis, supra note 1, at 1099.

4. The first computer put into commercial use was by General Electric Company
in 1954. FUORI, supra note 3, at 46. Historically, however, the Atarrasoff-Berry computer (ABC), completed in 1942 for the United States government, is generally recog-
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no surprise that just as the computer has brought about revolutionary changes in certain segments of society, courts find themselves
facing equally new and complex legal issues in areas such as the
negligent use of computers, the right to keep computer records private, and the duty to use a computer in specific cases.
This article surveys the legal issues which arise from contractual disputes involving computer-related goods. It will focus upon
both computer hardware,5 including the computer itself and its peripheral equipment (e.g., tape drives, 6 printers, 7 disk drives 8 ), as
well as computer software, 9 including computer programs 10 of all
types, together with the products of the computer systems design effort (e.g., flow charts,1 1 documentation 1 2). Though the following discussion will concern mainly computer hardware and software
nized as the first digital computer. M HOLOIEN, COMPUTERS AND THEIR SOCIETAL
IMPACT 38-40 (1977).
5. Hardware is defined as "[p]hysical equipment used in data processing, as opposed to the computer programs, procedures, rules, and associated documentation."
Dictionary for Information Processing, Fed. Info. Proc. Standards Pub. 11-1 (Sept. 30,
1977), reprinted in 1 R. BIGELOW, COMPUTER L. SERV. § 1-3, art. 1, at 72 (1978) (italics
omitted) [hereinafter cited as "Dictionary"]. Also, a few courts have used their own
definition of hardware. In Law Res. Serv., Inc., 5 CLSR 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), the court
stated: "'Hardware' consists of the computer itself and its mechanical appurtenances .. " Id. at 222.
6. Information may be stored on magnetic tape. The computer can then later
read this information using a magnetic tape drive. Dictionary, supra note 5, at 153.
7. The printer is used to produce hard copy printouts from the computer, including human-readable reports.
8. Information may be stored on a magnetic disk (also spelled disc) defined as
"[a] flat circular plate with a magnetic surface layer." Dictionary, supra note 5, at 93
(italics omitted). The magnetic disk can then be placed onto a disk drive, which is
linked to the computer. The computer can either read or write information from or
onto the magnetic disk through the electronics of the disk drive.
9. "Computer programs, procedures, rules and possibly associated documentation concerned with the operation of a data processing system." Id. at 144 (italics
omitted). Cases defining the term software include Law Res. Serv., Inc., 5 CLSR 229
(S.D.N.Y. 1972), where the court stated that ". . . 'software' consists of punch cards,
magnetic tape, paper tape, etc., all programmed to instruct the computer what to do,
'when you want it to do it.'" Id. at 222.
10. "A schedule or plan that specifies actions that may or may not be taken." Dictionary, supra note 5, at 121.
11. "(A] graphical representation of the definition, analysis or method of solution
of a problem, in which symbols are used to represent operations, data, flow, equipment, etc." Id. at 66 (italics omitted).
12. "The management of documents which may include the actions of identifying,
. A collection of docuacquiring, processing, storing and disseminating them *
ments on a given subject." Id. at 28 (italics omitted).
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supplied for commercial purposes, many of the same legal principles
13
apply equally to the ever-increasing home computer market.
The term "computer system" will be used in this article to refer
to computer hardware and/or computer software. This is done not
only for ease of discussion, but also because computer hardware
and software are increasingly being sold or leased as a unit intended
to produce a specific result. Where applicable, however, and especially when discussing implied warranties, computer software will
be considered separately because of the special problems presented
14
by application of the Uniform Commercial Code.
This article addresses the liability that arises between contracting parties and, therefore, does not discuss the issue of liability
to injured third parties. Since the number of cases dealing with
computer contracts is somewhat limited, some of the liability concepts will, of necessity, be drawn from cases arising in other areas
and applied by analogy to the computer field. Finally, this article
does not provide a checklist of items to be considered when entering
into contract negotiations for computer systems, but concentrates
on the issues of liability which arise after the agreement has been
5
made and either wholly or partially performed.1
Many of the cases which are examined arose out of a basic disagreement over what was to be supplied in the computer system.
Though such disputes are certainly not unique to the computer field,
they are particularly prevalent in this area. While many purchasers 16 of computer systems have heard of the great feats that computers can perform, relatively few have had first-hand experience
with the equipment. Thus, the problems which arise often stem
from the purchaser's inability to request exactly what he requires.
13. Kleinman, A Computer in Every Home-Fact or Fantasy, RADio-ELEc., Aug.
1978, at 14, 14;Weizenbaum, Once More-A Computer Revolution, BULL. ATomc SCL,
Sept. 1978, at 12, 12-19; Dorfman, supra note 1, at 9-11; Minicomputers Challenge the
Big Machine, supra note 1, at 58-63.
14 The Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) is a uniform set of laws which regu-

late commercial transactions. The U.C.C. has been adopted in most states either in
its entirety or with slight modifications. Article 2 of the U.C.C. regulates the sale of
goods. See notes 85-109, 125, 145, 163 & 172 infra and accompanying text.
15. The reader interested in a checklist approach to constructing data processing
contracts is directed to Computer Contract Checklist, 2 R. BIGELOW, COMPTER L
SERV. § 3-2, art. 5 (1975); Carter, A Checklist for Using Batch and Remote Batch Services, 24 DATAMATION, Apr. 1978, at 99.
16. The term "purchaser" is used to refer to one who purchases or leases computer goods or services. The legal issues discussed in this article apply equally to either, except the discussion on "hell or highwater clauses," which apply only to a
lessee. See text accompanying notes 172-77 infra. Also, the term "vendor" is used to
indicate one who either sells or leases computer-related goods or services.
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When the results achieved by the computer system do not live up to
these expectations, it is natural to consider those who supplied the
machine as the cause of the difficulties.
The confusion which exists in contracting for computer systems
equally traps the vendor, since even among those knowledgeable in
the industry there is widespread disagreement over the definition of
common terms. Those who feel uneasy with the oft-confusing terminology of the computer field can find solace in a comment by Judge
Edenfield in Honeywell, Inc. v. Lithonia Lighting, Inc. 17:
After hearing the evidence in this case the first finding that the
court is constrained to make is that, in the computer age, lawyers
and courts need no longer feel ashamed or even sensitive about the
charge, often made, that they confuse the issue by resort to legal
'jargon', law Latin or Norman French. By comparison, the misnomers and industrial shorthand of the computer world make the
most esoteric legal writing seem as clear and lucid as the Ten Commandments or the Gettysburg Address; and to add to this Babel,
same
the experts in the computer field, while using exactly the
18
words, uniformly disagree as to precisely what they mean.
The discussion which follows is organized around the issues
which have been most frequently raised in the reported cases involving contract disputes for computer goods and services. The issues have been arranged according to when they would arise during
the contractual relationship. The discussion, therefore, begins with
an examination of statements made prior to the signing of any actual contract, to determine if these statements were sufficient to
constitute fraud, or if they were excluded from the agreement by operation of the parol evidence rule. 19 Next, the agreement itself is examined to determine the outcome of issues involving express and
implied warranties and limitations of liability and liquidated damages clauses. The remedies which the courts have found appropriate are evaluated along with an examination of the requirement of
the injured party to mitigate damages. Finally, the article discusses
the special problems presented in the case of the assignment of
rights under a computer lease.
I. REPRESENTATIONS
Despite their technical sophistication, the same basic marketing
17. 317 F. Supp. 406, 2 CLSR 894 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
18. Id. at 408, 2 CLSR at 896.
19. The parol evidence rule states briefly that once the parties to a contract have

reduced the agreement to a writing intended to constitute their entire understanding,
they cannot introduce into evidence at trial statements not in the writing to change
the meaning of the contract terms. See text accompanying notes 65-84 infra.
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strategies are usually followed in selling computer systems as with
other large ticket items. What is said and done during the early
stages of this marketing activity can have a profound impact on subsequent questions of legal liability. It is not surprising to find an
overeager vendor lauding the virtues of its computer system.
Though computers can and do provide significant improvements in
business operations, they are not a panacea for an organization's difficulties and frequently fall short of what was promised or expected.
The analysis whbch must be followed to determine the possibility
of misrepresentations begins when the purchaser discovers, to his
chagrin, that the computer system he leased or purchased does not
live up to what he believes was promised. The first question to consider is whether the contract was signed in reliance on a misrepresentation by the vendor. One of the most important cases
addressing this issue is Clements Auto Company v. Service Bureau
Corporation.20 In Clements, the plaintiff operated several wholesale
auto supply houses in Minnesota. The Service Bureau Corporation
(SBC) had provided a successful computer system to a Chevrolet
dealership, with whom Clements was affiliated. SBC and Clements
subsequently entered into an agreement whereby SBC was to supply Clements with a computer system which included inventory
control software. The system provided by SBC proved unsatisfactory, and Clements sued for recission, breach of implied warranty,
21
breach of contract, reformation and fraudulent misrepresentation.
The trial court found that SBC had made misrepresentations to
Clements when its salesmen stated that the only way that Clements
could obtain an inventory control system was to automate his entire
20. 298 F. Supp. 115, 2 CLSR 102 (D. Minn. 1969), affd as modified, 444 F.2d 169, 2
CLSR 143 (8th Cir. 1971).
21. The elements of fraudulent misrepresentation under Minnesota law are:
1. There must be a representation;
2. That representation must be false;
3. It must have to do with a past or present fact;
4. That fact must be material;
5. It must be susceptible of knowledge;
6. The representer must know it to be false, or in the alternative, must assert it as of his own knowledge without knowing whether it is true or
false;
7. The representer must intend to have the other person induced to act, or
justified in acting upon it:
8. That person must be so induced to act or so justified in acting;
9. That person's action must be in reliance upon the representation;
10. That person must suffer damage;
11. That damage must be attributable to the misrepresentation, that is, the
statement must be the proximate cause of the injury.
444 F.2d at 175, 2 CLSR at 153-54.
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accounting system. 22 In fact, the court found that most of the difficulties encountered with the computer system arose from SBC's attempts to automate the accounting area. The court found that these
efforts were not necessary to provide Clements with the proposed
23
inventory control system.
SBC had also recommended the specific data input equipment
to be used. The hardware proved to be too slow to handle the volume of transactions which Clements experienced. 24 Finally, the
computer system was full of errors and provided inadequate controls, despite SBC's representation "that there were controls built
into the system which were adequate to prevent any but a minimal
number of errors."25
SBC attempted to have all statements regarding the computer
system made during the sales negotiations excluded on the grounds
that the contract contained a valid integration clause excluding
those statements, and that Clements had waived all express and implied warranties. 26 The court held that the exclusion and waiver
provisions were valid defenses only against Clements' breach of
contract claim, and that SBC could not avoid liability for misrepre27
sentation by reliance on cleverly drafted contractual provisions.
Throughout the time period that Clements had experienced difficulties with the computer system, SBC made significant efforts to
rectify the problems, and it was not until several years after the contract was originally signed that Clements brought suit. The trial
court awarded Clements $480,811 in damages for SBC's misrepresentations. 28 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, while upholding the
decision, reduced the award to $247,000, since it found that Clements
was not justified in relying upon the representations of SBC for as
long as it had, and should have taken steps earlier to mitigate its
damages. 29 Though the specific types of damages which may be
awarded are discussed in more detail below, 30 it is worth noting that
despite the subsequent reduction in damages, Clements was still reimbursed for the increased out-of-pocket costs incurred as a result
22. Id. at 183, 2 CLSR at 166. SBC conceded that the statements were false, but
contended that the statements were "so patently unbelievable that no reasonable re-

liance could be placed on it." Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 182-83, 2 CLSR at 165-66.
25. Id. at 175, 2 CLSR at 153.
26. Id. at 176, 2 CLSR at 155.
27. Id. at 178-79, 2 CLSR at 158-60.
28. Id. at 173, 2 CLSR at 150.
29. Id. at 191, 2 CLSR at 179.
30. See text accompanying notes 140-65 infra.
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of the poorly designed computer system, including the extra clerical
and supervisory salaries required to deal with the computer sys31
tem's erroneous output.
Though decided in a jurisdiction where scienter is not a required element of misrepresentation, 32 Clements remains one of the
most important cases in this area. Some commentators have predicted that a similar decision might well be reached even in jurisdic33
tions where scienter is required for a finding of misrepresentation.
Courts permit some "puffing" by salesman by holding that it is
not reasonable to rely upon what is basically a personal opinion.
However, the line between representations of fact and opinions is
often very narrow. In Sperry Rand Corporationv. IndustrialSupply
Corporation,34 suit was brought for recission, breach of express and
implied warranties, and fraud against Sperry Rand. 35 The court
found that statements by Sperry Rand salesmen were "representations on behalf of Sperry Rand and not merely the opinions of salesmen, and that the [computer] equipment was not reasonably fit for
the purpose and use for which it was intended and had been recommended. '36 Sperry Rand argued unsuccessfully that its statements
constituted only an opinion, and pointed to a paragraph in its
brochure which stated that "[i]t is understood that the recommendations herein are intended only for consideration by your organization and that the detailed operating advantages are obtainable
through the integrated utilization of Remington Rand products and
services. ' 37 The brochure, however, went on to specify the exact
computer equipment which Industrial Supply should purchase and
the results which could be expected. 3 8 The court found that such
detailed statements were more than opinion, and that Industrial
Supply could reasonably have been expected to rely upon those rec39
ommendations.
The Court also held that under New York law Sperry Rand had
breached its implied warranty of fitness for the intended purpose.40
31. 444 F.2d at 191, 2 CLSR at 179.
32, Id. at 176, 2 CLSR at 154. See note 21 supra.
33. Comment, Imposing Liability on Data Processing Services--Should California Choose Fraudor Warranty?,13 SANTA CLARA LAw. 140, 152 (1972).

337 F.2d 363, 1 CLSR 312 (5th Cir. 1964).
Id. at 365, 1 CLSR at 314.
Id. at 367, 1 CLSR at 317.
Id. at 366, 1 CLSR at 314-15.
Id. at 366, 1 CLSR at 315-16.
Id at 369-70, 1 CLSR at 320-21.
U.C.C. § 2-315 (1978) provides:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reasons to know any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
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The court reasoned that since the warranty was implied by law, the
integration clause in the contract was ineffective to exclude the introduction at trial of parol evidence to show the purpose for which
the equipment was to be used and Sperry Rand's knowledge of the
intended use of the computer.4 1 The court, however, found against
Industrial Supply on the issue of fraud.42
In contrast, the court in Westfield Chemical Corporationv. Burroughs Corporation43 held that statements of Burroughs' salesmen,
which predicted possible man-hour cost savings by use of the proposed computer, were simply opinions and not statements of actual
fact.4 The court reasoned that inasmuch as possible man-hour savings were dependent on numerous factors beyond the control of
Burroughs (e.g., the efficiency of Westfield's own employees), such
statements "related to future performances not susceptible of actual
'45
knowledge and cannot serve as a basis for recovery in fraud.
There are several elements of misrepresentation with which the
courts have dealt in the area of computer systems. First, if the purchaser knew or had reason to know that the representation was
false, a claim of misrepresentation will fail. 46 Such a situation was
present in Fruit Industries Research Foundation v. National Cash
Register Company,47 where the purchaser had knowledge of the
slow speed of a recommended printer. The court held that Fruit Industries could not therefore have relied upon a false representation
by National Cash Register of the capability of the printer.48
Next, reliance by the purchaser on the representations of the
vendor must be reasonable. For instance, predictions on the part of
a salesman as to when the programming is to be complete or
promises to attempt to obtain clients for the purchaser of a computer system were found not to constitute fraud in Shivers v. Sweda
International,Inc.,49 since the purchaser confessed his reliance on
on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is
unless excluded or modified under the next section an implied warranty that
the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
41. 337 F.2d at 371, 1 CLSR at 322-23.
42. Id. at 365, 1 CLSR at 314.
43. 6 CLSR 438 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1977).
44. Id. at 442-43.
45. Id. at 441.
46. It is a fundamental principle of the law of fraud, regardless of the form of
relief sought, that in order to secure redress, the representee must have relied upon the statement or representation as an inducement to his action or
injurious change of position.
37 Am. Jur.2d Fraud and Deceit § 223, at 297 (1968).
47. 406 F.2d 546, 2 CLSR 92 (9th Cir. 1969).
48. Id. at 549, 2 CLSR at 95.
49. 146 Ga. App. 758, 247 S.E.2d 576 (1978).
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the salesman's promises was "naive," "very stupid," and "unreason50
able.,
Finally, the purchaser may not have relied upon the misrepresentation made by the vendor at all. In Investors Premium Corporation v. Burroughs Corporation5' the vendor recommended using
only one of its computers to handle the work of the purchaser. However, the purchaser conducted its own study and, discovering that
one would be insufficient to handle the job, ordered two units. The
contracts were executed after the need for two machines had become evident to the purchaser. The court found that there was no
reliance on the original recommendation and that by signing the
later contract which called for two units, the purchaser waived its
52
rights to bring suit upon Burrough's preliminary miscalculations.
An area of special importance in misrepresentations involving
computer systems is the relative knowledge of computers held by
the parties. In Clements,5 3 the court took "notice of the inequality of
knowledge as between the two parties. SBC was clearly the expert
in the computer field and must be held responsible for superior
knowledge in that field."54 Disparity of knowledge, however, is not
limited to instances where one of the parties lacks all knowledge of
computers. In Strand v. Librascope, Inc.,55 the court found that
even between parties of seemingly equal knowledge within the field
of electronic data processing, the one with only a slight edge on information is in a superior position in making representations about
particular computer products. That case involved representations
made by a manufacturer of magnetic read/record heads used for
magnetic drum units. The purchaser later assembled the
read/record heads and found that they failed to function properly.
The court found that while Strand had extensive knowledge of computers in general, the defendant had special expertise with regard to
the special hardware that it supplied and, therefore, Strand was justified in relying on the representations made by the defendant con56
cerning those computer components.
If the results expected from a computer system do not materialize, a purchaser cannot claim, however, that the vendor is liable for
misrepresentation simply because it has a superior knowledge of
50.
51.
52.
53.
1971).
54.
55.
56.

Id.
389 F. Supp. 39, 6 CLSR 648 (D.S.C. 1974).
Id. at 46, 6 CLSR at 658.
Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d 169, 2 CLSR 143 (8th Cir.
Id. at 183, 2 CLSR at 167.
197 F. Supp. 743, 1 CLSR 164 (E.D. Mich. 1961).
Id. at 752-53, 1 CLSR at 179-81.
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computers. In Honeywell, Inc. v. Lithonia Lighting, Inc.,5 7 the court
looked skeptically upon plaintiffs claim of misrepresentation by
Honeywell since, during the entire period, plaintiff had three managers in its computer department who were computer experts, though
they may not have been as familiar with the computer field as Hon58
eywell.
Often a vendor of computer-related goods or services may try to
obtain a competitive edge by claiming a revolutionary breakthrough
which simply has not yet occurred. Such a situation was present in
United States v. Wegematic Corporation.5 9 The defendant,
Wegematic, claimed "a truly revolutionary system utilizing all of the
latest technical advances." 60 After a lengthy series of delays,
Wegematic asked to be relieved of its contractual obligations on the
ground of practical impossibility due to "basic engineering difficulties," which would cost $ 1-1.5 million and take up to two years to
remedy. 61 The court rejected the excuse, stating:
We see no basis for thinking that when an electronics system is
promoted by its manufacturer as a revolutionary breakthrough, the
risk of the revolution's occurrence falls on the purchaser; the reasonable supposition is that it has already occurred or, at least, that
that it will be found to
the manufacturer is assuring the purchaser
62
have when the machine is assembled.
In the area of computer contracts, the tort of misrepresentation
has proven extremely important. In Clements,6 3 had the plaintiff
been required to rely upon the contract provisions, the decision
would probably have been adverse, since the contract contained
clauses which limited SBC's liability and excluded all warranties. If
a vendor has included warranty disclaimers and liability limitations
in the contract, a cause of action for misrepresentation is often the
only legal remedy available.
ADMISSIBILITY OF REPRESENTATIONS

IL

In resolving a contract dispute, it is necessary to establish the
precise terms of the agreement. However, it is not unusual to find
business relationships where "gentlemen's agreements" are never
reflected in the final written contract. Since negotiations for a com57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

1971).

317 F. Supp. 406, 2 CLSR 894 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
Id. at 409, 2 CLSR at 898-99.
360 F.2d 674, 1 CLSR 359 (2d Cir. 1966).
Id. at 675, 1 CLSR at 359.
Id. at 675, 1 CLSR at 360.
Id. at 676, 1 CLSR at 362.
Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 444 F. 2d 169, 2 CLSR 143 (8th Cir.
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puter system may occur over a period of months or even years, and
since many points are often compromised and positions changed
during those negotiations, an integration clause" may be used to
create a final agreement. Though the final contract is in writing and
contains an integration clause, statements made during the preliminary negotiations, even if insufficient to constitute fraud, may have a
determinative impact on the outcome of the dispute.
The parol evidence rule states that if a valid integration clause
exists in an agreement, no extrinsic evidence can be admitted at
trial to alter the terms of that agreement. 65 Despite the seemingly
clear intent of the parol evidence rule, disagreements concerning
the circumstances under which extrinsic evidence will be admitted
are qule frequent. "Few subjects connected with the interpretation
of contracts present so simple and uniform a statement of principle,
bedeviled by such a perplexing and harassing number of difficulties
''66
in its application, as the parol evidence rule.
The parol evidence rule is . particularly strong tool for a vendor,
since promises made by comb- oar salesmen during sales presentations can effectively be excluded from the contract by a properly
drafted integration clause.67 In National Cash Register Company v.
Modern Transfer Company,68 the defendant refused to accept an installed National Cash Register (NCR) computer, claiming that NCR
had made a number of oral misrepresentations which induced Modern Transfer to execute the purchase contract.69 The court looked to
the integration clause and, finding that its intent was to exclude
prior statements from the final agreement, refused to admit testi70
mony which contradicted the terms of the contract.
If, however, the agreement is vague or silent on particular
points, parol evidence is admissible to clarify any resultant ambigui64. "Courts have generally agreed that if the parties have integrated their agreement into a single written memorial, all prior negotiations and agreements in regard
to the same subject matter are excluded from consideration whether they were written or oral." 4 S. WI..STON, CONTRACTS § 632, at 977 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1961).
65. Id. § 631, at 948-53.
66. Id. § 632A, at 984.
67. A good example of a court excluding preliminary documents generated during
early negotiations cari be found in Law Res. Serv., Inc. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 1
CLSR 1002 (Sup. Ct. 1968), where one party attempted to introduce an unsigned document drafted prior to the signing of the actual contract as evidence of an understanding different than what was contained in the final agreement. The court held
that such evidence was inadmissible and constituted preliminary negotiations. Id. at
1003-04.
68. 224 Pa. Super. 138, 302 A.2d 486, 5 CLSR 642 (1973).
69. Id. at 140-42, 302 A.2d at 487-88, 5 CLSR 644.
70. Id. at 144-45, 302 A.2d at 490-91, 5 CLSR at 647-49.
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ties.71 In Security Leasing Company v. Flinco, Inc.,72 the plaintiff
supplied a computer under a five year lease contract containing an
integration clause. Flinco sought to return the equipment, claiming
that because of incomplete computer programming the computer
could not be used. Since the written contract did not disclose who
was to do the programming, the court held that parol evidence was
admissible to determine that responsibility. 73 By admitting parol
evidence, the court determined that the programming was to be
done by Security Leasing and sustained Flinco's rejection of the
computer system. 7 4 Similar circumstances were present in the Canadian case of Burroughs Business Machines Ltd. v. Feed-Rite Mills
Ltd.,75 where the court found that the agreement for computer hardware did not constitute the entire agreement between the parties,
and that Honeywell had breached an oral agreement to provide critical training and programming support.
Carl Beasley Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs Corporation76 involved a
written contract for computer equipment. Since Burroughs had a
practice of not executing written agreements for programming support, Burroughs salesmen orally agreed to provide thirteen programs to plaintiff. These programs were never supplied in working
condition. 77 Burroughs contended that the written agreement contained a provision excluding all prior statements, including the fact
that Burroughs would perform certain programming.7 8 The court,
however, held that since the hardware was useless without the programming, and the written agreement did not specifically mention
the programs, the written contract could not have constituted the
entire agreement between the parties and Burrough's oral promise
was admissible.7 9 The effectiveness of an integration clause proved
crucial in IBM Corporationv. Catamore Enterprises,Inc.8 0 In that
case, Catamore, a jewelry manufacturer, sued IBM for its failure to
provide a promised production control system.8 1 The lower court
71. 3 A. CoRnN, CONTRACTS § 578, at 411 (1960).
72. 23 Utah 2d 242, 461 P.2d 460, 2 CLSR 472 (1969).
73. Id. at 244, 461 P.2d at 461-62, 2 CLSR at 474.
74. Id. at 245, 461 P.2d at 462, 2 CLSR at 475.
75. 42 D.L.R.3d 303, 4 CLSR 1050 (Man. Ct. App. 1973).
76. 361 F. Supp. 325, 4 CLSR 523 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
77. Id. at 328-29, 4 CLSR at 529-31.
78. Id. at 332, 4 CLSR at 535.
79. Id. at 332-33, 4 CLSR at 536.
80. 548 F.2d 1065, 5 CLSR 1409 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 960 (1977).
81. The production control system was defined as:
... (1) an "order entry system" for the analysis of incoming orders from customers (i.e., showing what end product items were required); (2) invoicing
(i.e., showing what end product items have been shipped); (3) inventory con-

19791

COMPUTER CONTRACTS

awarded Catamore $11 million, based primarily on its finding of a
breach of an oral agreement by IBM to supply programming support
to Catamore.8 2 The First Circuit Court of Appeals, however, held
that the oral agreement had been integrated in a subsequent written
contract containing a one year limitation of liability clause. 83 Since
Catamore failed to bring its action within the one year period, the
appellate court reversed the verdict. 84
II. WARRANTIES
Absent a finding of fraud, and assuming that the vendor is successful in excluding promises made prior to the signing of the written contract, the vendor may still have breached an express or
implied warranty. Most express warranties in contracts for computer systems are limited to the replacement of defective parts and
the correction of errors discovered in the software. As with a contract for any item, the courts will uphold valid express warranties,
but will also recognize properly drafted limitations on those warranties.
Implied warranties have received a great deal of attention in
cases dealing with computer systems. The Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC) implied warranty of fitness for the intended purpose
has been deemed most applicable. However, since the UCC applies
only to the sale of goods, 85 the first question which must be addressed is whether the thing supplied constitutes "goods" under the
UCC. 86
Little question exists that computer hardware constitutes goods
under the UCC. Likewise, programming and systems design clearly
constitute services, and are not goods. 87 However, since computers
today are frequently sold as "turn-key" systems, consisting of both
the hardware and the software combined to achieve a specific result,
trol (i.e., showing what items are on hand); and (4) a bill of materials system
(i.e. showing what components are required to fill incoming orders).
Id. at 1068 n.3, 5 CLSR at 1412 n.3.
82. Id. at 1074 & n.18, 5 CLSR at 1422-23 & n.18.
83. Id. at 1075, 5 CLSR at 1423-24.
84. Id. at 1076, 5 CLSR at 1426.
85. "Unless the context otherwise requires, this Article applies to transactions in
goods ... ." U.C.C. § 2-102 (1978).
86. "'Goods' means all things (including specially manufactured goo-Is) which
U.C.C. § 2-105
are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale.
(1978).
87. Though the service may not constitute goods, the product of the service, e.g.
computer reports, magnetic tape, may constitute goods. See Computer Servicenters,
Inc., v. Beacon Mfg. Co., 328 F. Supp. 653, 655, 3 CLSR 58, 60-61 (D.S.C. 1970), aff'd, 443
F.2d 906, 3 CLSR 64 (4th Cir. 1971).
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the problem of whether the vendor has supplied goods or not is particularly troublesome. Businessmen tend to look at the combined
computer system or the resultant output as what was bargained for
and the courts have had little difficulty sustaining that contention. 88
Once the court reaches that conclusion, it has had little difficulty
viewing "turn-key" systems as goods and not services. 89
If it is found that what was supplied constitutes goods, then one
or both of the UCC implied warranties may apply. First, UCC section 2-315 provides for an implied warranty of fitness for the intended purpose. 90 Since many contracts involving computer
systems call for a close working relationship between the contracting parties over an extended period of time, the courts have had
no problem finding that the vendor knew of the use to which the
computer system was to be put. For example, in Lovely v. Bur91
roughs Corporation,
the court found that Burroughs had worked
closely with the plaintiffs and "that plaintiffs were relying on defendant's judgement in furnishing suitable goods. '92 Similarly, in
Public Utilities Commission for City of Waterloo v. Burroughs Machines Ltd.93 the court found that Burroughs had breached its implied warranty when it supplied hardware which was useless
without the unsupplied software, and held that the computer system
was therefore unfit for the intended purpose. 94
Many states also imply a warranty of fitness for the intended
purpose outside that provided under the UCC. An interesting computer case involving such a warranty is Sperry Rand Corporationv.
Industrial Supply Corporation.95 In that case, a computer system
was to be tailored to the purchaser's unique needs and was to supply order writing, invoicing, inventory, accounts receivable, salesmen's commissions, accounts payable, batch ordering and
88. For instance in Carl Beasley Ford; supra, the court noted that ". . . plaintiff
might well have carried its burden simply by proving that defendant had promised to
produce a result (accounting records suitable for its purposes) and that defendant
had failed to do so .. " 361 F. Supp. 325, 331, 4 CLSR 523, 534 (E.D. Pa. 1973). In
Burroughs Business Mach. Ltd. v. Feed-Rite Mills Ltd., 42 D.L.R.3d 303, 4 CLSR 1050
(Man. Ct. App. 1973), the court found that "Feed-Rite purchased a computer to do its
complete acounting. Due to defects in the equipment and the failure of plaintiff to
fully programme the unit there was a breach of contract of such severity that it went
to the root of the matter." Id. at 307, 4 CLSR at 1053.
89. Id. at 307-08, 4 CLSR at 1053.
90. U.C.C. § 2-315 (1978). See note 40 supra for text of section.
91. 165 Mont. 209, 527 P.2d 557, 5 CLSR 710 (1974).
92. Id. at 213, 527 P.2d at 560, 5 CLSR at 712.
93. 34 D.LR.3d 320, 4 CLSR 564 (Ont. 1973).
94. Id. at 326, 4 CLSR at 572.
95. 337 F.2d 363, 1 CLSR 312 (5th Cir. 1964). This case is discussed in more detail
in the text accompanying notes 34-42 supra.
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purchasing department activities. 96 The supplied system failed to
function properly and Industrial Supply brought suit for recission.
The court upheld Industrial Supply's claim for breach of implied
warranty, finding that "[tihe evidence here clearly establishes the
knowledge of Sperry Rand as to the particular purposes for which
Industrial Supply desired to purchase the equipment, and the reliance by the buyer upon the judgment of the seller. '97 The court decided the case under Florida's common law implied warranty, rather
98
than that contained in the Uniform Commercial Code.
UCC section 2-314 implies a warranty of merchantability "if the
seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind."99 While the
merchantability issue has been raised in several cases, it has always
been combined with a claim of breach of implied warranty of fitness
for the intended purpose.
The defendant may claim that the plaintiff has waived the implied warranties by failing to reject the equipment. However, there
is no requirement that the purchaser immediately reject the computer system, so long as the rejection is made within a reasonable
period of time. 1°° Since most purchasers have a significant investment in both time and money in a computer system, it is not unusual for a purchaser to make concerted and often lengthy efforts to
work with the vendor to rectify the problems. Thus, the court found
in Lovely v. Burroughs Corporation0 1 that, though the plaintiff had
retained the computer system for eight months, it had not "accepted" the computer system and its "actions amount to a good faith
attempt to permit defendant to.remedy the defects .... 1,102
Nor is the purchaser deemed to have accepted the computer
equipment merely by installing it, if it has not had an opportunity to
determine if it meets the requirements of the contract. Such a situation was present in IndustrialSupply, 10 3 where the court found that
the plaintiff "could not be expected to ascertain, except by use and
experiment, the functional abilities and capacities of the electronic
96. Id. at 366, 1 CLSR at 315.
97. Id. at 369-70, 1 CLSR at 321.
98. Id. at 369, 1 CLSR at 320-21.
99. "Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall
be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with
respect to goods of that kind. * * * " U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (1978).
100. "Rejection of goods must be within a reasonable time after their delivery or
tender. It is ineffective unless the buyer seasonably notifies the seller." U.C.C. § 2602 (1978).
101. 165 Mont. 209, 527 P.2d 557, 5 CLSR 710 (1974).
102. Id. at 216, 527 P.2d at 561, 5 CLSR at 714.
103. Sperry Rand Corp. v. Industrial Supply Corp., 337 F.2d 363, 1 CLSR 312 (5th
Cir. 1964).
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equipment." 1° 4 Courts have also held that payment "subject to
machine performance" does not constitute acceptance. l0 5
The courts allow considerable leeway in determining whether a
party has rejected the goods within "a reasonable time" as required
by UCC section 2-602.106 In Carl Beasley,l0 7 the court found that a
rejection after eight months was not unreasonable "in view of the
complexity of the machine."'10 8
IV. THE EXTENT OF LIABILITY UNDER THE AGREEMENT
Though a vendor may be liable for breach of an express warranty or for breach of one of the implied warranties, such liability
may be limited by the terms of the agreement. UCC section 2-316
allows implied warranties to be disclaimed, as long as the disclaimer
is in writing, conspicious, not unconscionable, and specifically mentions merchantability if it seeks to limit that implied warranty. 10 9
In Bakal v. Burroughs Corporation,"0 the purchaser of a computer system brought suit claiming breach of the implied warranties
of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, and requesting consequential damages."' The court found that the contract
signed by the purchaser contained provisions waiving express and
implied warranties and all consequential damages; that those provisions met the requirements of UCC section 2-316; and that therefore,
recovery was denied. 112 Likewise, the courts in both Westfield
Chemical Corporation v. Burroughs Corporation113 and Investors
Premium Corporation v. Burroughs Corporation1 14 found a valid
104. Industrial Supply did not know and could not be expected to ascertain,
except by use and experiment, the functional abilities and capabilities of the
electronic equipment, with its transistors, tubes and diodes, its varicolored
maze of wiring, its buttons and switches, and the supplementing of machines
and devices for punching cards and others for the sorting thereof. And, of
course, the personnel of Industrial Supply could not be expected to understand the processes by which a set of these modern miracle-makers perform
their tasks.
Id. at 370, 1 CLSR at 321.
105. Burroughs Business Mach. Ltd. v. Feed-Rite Mills Ltd., 42 D.LR.3d 303, 306, 5

CLSR 885, 888 (Man. Ct. App. 1973).
106. See note 100 supra.

107. Carl Beasley Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 361 F. Supp. 325, 4 CLSR 523 (E.D.
Pa. 1973).
108. Id. at 330-31, 4 CLSR at 533.
109. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1978).
110. 74 Misc. 2d 202, 343 N.Y.S.2d 541, 4 CLSR 205 (1972).
111. Id. at 203-04, 343 N.Y.S.2d at 542-43, 4 CLSR at 206-07.
112. Id. at 204-06, 343 N.Y.S.2d at 543-45, 4 CLSR at 207-09.
113. 6 CLSR 438, 439 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1977).

114. 389 F. Supp. 39, 45, 6 CLSR 648, 656-57 (D.S.C. 1974).
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disclaimer of all express and implied warranties.
However, the provision limiting damages must be clearly and
specifically drawn. In Lovely, 115 the court found that a clause limiting consequential damages referred only to damages for delays in
delivery of the computer equipment. 116 Since plaintiff's losses were
a result of the failure of the computer equipment to function properly, recovery for the damages due to the computer 7malfunction was
not precluded by the limitation of liability clause."1
The vendor may also limit damages by setting a maximum dollar amount of recovery. In FarrisEngineering Corporationv. Service Bureau Corporation,1 8 the court upheld a clause which limited
recovery to the amount paid by the purchaser on the contract.
Though the requirements for finding unconscionability are less
stringent in the area of commercial contracts than with consumer
goods, the issue has been successfully argued in the lower courts in
contracts dealing with computer systems. In Burroughs Corporation
v. Chesapeake Petroleum & Supply Company,1 19 the purchaser
signed a contract with fourteen printed paragraphs on the reverse
side of the document, one of which disclaimed all express and implied warranties and another which waived all rights to damages
under the contract. 20 The trial court held that enforcement of the
provisions on the reverse side of the agreement would be unconscionable. 12 1 The trial court also found that due to the wording on
the front of the agreement, the entire set of provisions on the back
were not part of the contract. 122 On appeal, Burroughs challenged
the trial court's finding of unconscionability. The court of appeals
did not reach that issue, however, resting its affirmance on the lower
court's finding that the provisions on the back of the document were
123
not part of the contract.
V. LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
In some cases, agreements may establish liquidated damages
for failure of one or both of the parties to perform its obligations.
Liquidated damages provisions are an effort to estimate in advance
115. Lovely v. Burroughs Corp., 165 Mont. 209, 527 P.2d 557, 5 CLSR 710 (1974).
116. Id. at 219, 527 P.2d at 563, 5 CLSR at 717.
117. Id.
118. 276 F. Supp. 643, 1 CLSR 902 (D.NJ. 1967), aft'd, 406 F.2d 519, 1 CLSR 905 (3d
Cir. 1969).
119. 282 Md. 406, 384 A.2d 734, 6 CLSR 782 (1978).
120. Id. at 407, 384 A.2d at 735, 6 CLSR at 783.
121. Id. at 409, 384 A.2d at 735, 6 CLSR at 784.
122. Id. at 409, 384 A.2d at 735-36, 6 CLSR at 784.
123. Id. at 412, 384 A.2d at 736-37, 6 CLSR at 785-87.
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what damages may be suffered if, for example, the computer system
is not delivered as expected. 124 It serves as an excellent inducement
to the vendor to carry through as agreed. The courts will generally
allow amounts for liquidated damages if they are reasonable estimates of the damage which would be sustained by a breach on the
part of one party. 125 Care must be taken, however, to insure that
such amounts do not exceed that level, since the courts will set
126
aside any excess amounts as being a penalty.
Typical liquidated damage provisions involving computer systems provide for the payment of certain sums by the vendor for delays in delivery. An excellent example of an award for delay
occurred in Wegematic.127 In that case, the agreement provided for
$100 per day damages for delay in delivery of the computer equipment.128 The court of appeals upheld an award of $46,300 under this
129
clause for Wegematic's delay.
Wegematic had further agreed that if it failed to comply "with
any provision"' 30 of the agreement, the purchaser could "procure
the services described in the contract from other sources and hold
the Contractor responsible for any excess costs occasioned
thereby."' 13 Based upon Wegematic's failure to deliver the equipment, the government purchased an IBM 650 computer. Wegematic
was held liable for $179,450-the additional cost of the IBM equip132
ment.
VI. NEGLIGENCE
Through this article focuses on contractual liability, complaints
124. 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1059, at 345-48 & § 1072, at 403-12 (1960).
125. Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement
but only at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or
A term fixing unreasonably large liqactual harm caused by the breach ....
uidated damages is void as a penalty. ***
U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (1978).
126. 5 A. CORBN, CONTRACTS § 1057, at 332-37 (1960).
127. United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674, 1 CLSR 359 (2d Cir. 1966). See

the text accompanying notes 59-62 supra for a factual description of the case.
128. Id. at 675, 1 CLSR at 359.
129. Id. at 675, 1 CLSR at 360. The computer equipment was actually never deliv-

ered. The damages covered the 463 days between the date for delivery set forth in
the contract and the date of delivery to the government of replacement equipment.
The reasonableness of this length of time was not before the court.
130. Id. at 675, 1 CLSR at 359. Such provisions are not found in standard vendor
contracts; however, the United States government is able to extract more exacting
terms from vendors.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 675, 1 CLSR 360. An additional $10,056 in damages were awarded for
"preparatory expenses useless in operating the IBM system." Id.
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against computer vendors frequently contain a claim of negligence.
It should be recognized that the presence of a valid contract may not
only affect a claim of negligence, but may, in fact, preclude it. One
who performs an act under a contractual agreement in a negligent
manner is liable to the contracting party for damages under the
agreement and not under a theory of negligence. 133 This is particularly important, since recovery for damages in tort can be quite different than those under contract and could avoid any limitations on
liability or liquidated damages provisions contained in the contract.
In Datamark,Inc., 134 a contracting party with the Air Force miswired a device to a computer. The miswiring was viewed by the
court, not as negligence, but as poor workmanship, and thus arising
under the contract.135 Similarly, in Investors Premium Corporation
v. Burroughs Corporation,3 6 the plaintiff alleged negligence on the
part of Burroughs, which the court held to be actually a claim for
breach of contract. 37 Finally, in Chesapeake,3 8 the trial court dismissed the negligence count against Burroughs, since it found that
Burroughs owed no duty to the purchaser independent of the con139
tract.
VIL

REMEDIES

The remedies available to an injured party vary considerably,
depending upon the theory under which the action is brought. For
instance, the court in F & M Schaefer Corporationv. ElectronicData
Systems Corporation'4° found that computer programs were subject
to replevin, despite Schaefer's contention that the programs constituted concepts and ideas. The court pointed out, however, that "...
Schaefer has offered no case under New York law or any other law
services or
which holds that a data processing system, being wholly
14 1
replevin."'
of
subject
the
made
be
cannot
intangibles,
133. Fuchs v. Parsons Constr. Co., 166 Neb. 188, 191-92, 88 N.W.2d 648, 651-52 (1958).

134. 2 CLSR 79 (1969).
135. Id. at 82.
136. 389 F. Supp. 39, 6 CLSR 648 (D.S.C. 1974).
137. Id. at 42, 6 CLSR at 651-52.
138. Burroughs Corp. v. Chesapeake Petroleum & Supply Co., 282 Md. 406, 384 A.2d
734, 6 CLSR 782 (1978).
139. Id. at 409, 384 A.2d at 736, 6 CLSR at 784. The law will not impose liability on
one party in negligence unless a "duty" or manner of conduct was owed to another
party and that duty was breached. "A duty in negligence cases, may be defined as an
obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular
standard of conduct toward another." W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF ToRTs § 53, at 324 (4th
ed. 1971).
140. 430 F. Supp. 988, 6 CLSR 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
141. Id. at 992, 6 CLSR 183.
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If a user of computer equipment breaches the lease agreement,
the lessor is entitled to damages based upon the "benefit of the bargain" theory. 142 In Honeywell, Inc. v. Lithonia Lighting, Inc.,1 43 the
court found that the leasee had wrongfully terminated a lease for
computer equipment and held that Honeywell was entitled to the
net profit it W6uld have realized during the remainder of the contract. 1'

If, for some reason, a vendor supplying a computer system refuses to complete the contract, it would seem appropriate for the
purchaser to seek specific performance; 145 however, the court denied
such a request in Law Research Service, Inc. v. Western Union Telegraph Company,14 finding that the defendant's services were not so
unique as to warrant such a remedy.147 Where a vendor has spent a
significant amount of time preparing a unique computer system tailored for the purchaser's needs, however, it would be more likely
that such a request would be granted.
The purchaser of a computer system will often incur a substantial expense in preparing for delivery of the computer system. In
Applied Data Processing, Inc. v. Burroughs Corporation,148 despite
a contractual limitation on consequential damages, the court decided that Burroughs could be held liable for the expenses incurred
by the purchaser in converting to the new computer system, which
149
The
failed to operate properly and eventually had to be replaced.
142. "The law, in giving the injured party a right of action for damages. . . should
adjust the damages in such a way as to equal the value of performance ... ." 11 S.
WnLuSTON, CONTRACTS § 1339, at 204 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1968).
143. 317 F. Supp. 406, 2 CLSR 894 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
144. Id. at 412-13, 2 CLSR at 904.
145. When a breach of contract for the sale of goods occurs, the Uniform Commercial Code states:
(1) Specific performance may be decreed where the goods are unique
or in other proper circumstances.
(2) the decree for specific performance may include such terms and
conditions as to payment of the price, damages, or other relief as the court
may deem just.
(3)The buyer has a right of replevin for goods identified to the contract if
after reasonable effort he is unable to effect cover for such goods or the circumstances reasonably indicate that such effort will be unavailing or if the
goods have been shipped under reservation and satisfaction of the security
interest in them has been made or tendered.
U.C.C. § 2-716 (1978).
146. 1 CLSR 1002 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
147. Id. at 1007.
148. 394 F. Supp. 504, 5 CLSR 937 (D. Conn. 1975).
149. Id. at 507-08, 5 CLSR at 941-42. The reported decision, however, only addressed the issue of whether certain damages would be allowable if the alleged facts
were proven at trial. Id. at 505-06, 5 CLSR at 938.
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court found that since Burroughs failed to supply the system it
promised, the plaintiff could recover as reliance damages those costs
incurred in anticipation of the successful operation of the new
equipment.1 5 0 However, the consequential damages that the purchaser incurred while attempting to make the computer system
work could not be recovered because of a clause in the contract limiting their recovery. 15 1 Applied Data was allowed to recover the
costs of converting their IBM programs to a format acceptable to the
Burroughs machine, including supplies, staff training, labor,
software costs, the cost of transporting the Burroughs computer to
52
Simitheir premises and the cost of wiring for the new machine.
53
the government recovered the $10,056 it spent
larly, in Wegematic
in preparing for a computer system which was never deliver.1M
Damages are also awarded for such things as the rental deposit
on a computer system that was never delivered, 155 rental of comparable time when that which was promised was not supplied, 5 6 and
accelerated rental payments for breach of the payment terms of the
as damagreement. 157 Attorneys' fees, however, have been denied
15 8
ages, unless specifically provided for in the contract.
Where Burroughs breached an implied warranty of fitness for
intended purpose, the court awarded an accounting firm the loss it
sustained on the sale of a branch office, since the judge found that
the constantly malfunctioning computer system caused the sale of
the office at a loss. 15 9 He also awarded the accounting firm the costs
it incurred in attempting to make the computer work, in correcting
mistakes made by the computer, for preparation of a room for the
paid to additional help due to the comcomputer, and for salaries
160
puter-created problems.
Where a plaintiff succeeds under a theory of fraudulent misrep150. Id. at 507-08, 5 CLSR at 941-42.
151. Id. at 510, 5 CLSR at 945-46.
152. Id. at 507-09, 5 CLSR at 94143.
153. United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674, 1 CLSR 359 (2d Cir. 1966). See
notes 59-62 supra and accompanying text.
154. Id. at 675, 1 CLSR 360.
155. J. Dirats & Co. v. National Cash Register Co., 5 CLSR 1295 (Mass. App. Div.
1975).
156. Data Probe, Inc. v. 575 Computer Serv., Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 602, 608, 340 N.Y.S.2d
56, 62, 5 CLSR 511, 517 (1972).
157. Computer Property Corp. v. Columbia Distrib. Corp., 493 F.2d 953, 955, 5 CLSR
546, 547-48 (4th Cir. 1974).
158. Id. at 955, 5 CLSR at 549.
159. Iovely v. Burroughs Corp., 165 Mont. 209, 217, 527 P.2d 557, 562, 5 CLSR 710,
715 (1974).
160. Id. at 216, 527 P.2d at 561, 5 CLSR at 714-15.
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resentation, the appropriate damages are the difference between the
value of the computer system promised and the value of the system
161
actually received.
If the purchaser breaches, the vendor may be able to repossess
and sell the equipment, but only under both the terms of the contract and as regulated by the Uniform Commercial Code. In Nixdorf
Computer, Inc. v. Jet Forwarding,Inc.,162 the vendor repossessed
computer equipment and attempted to hold the purchaser to the deficiency in accordance with UCC section 2-708.163 The defaulting
purchaser contended, and the court agreed, that since the vendor
failed to notify the purchaser of the subsequent resale in accordance
165
with UCC section 9-504,164 no deficiency could be recovered.
VIII. MITIGATION OF DAMAGES
If a breach has occurred and one party is damaged as a result,
Applied Data Processing, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp. 394 F. Supp. 504, 509-10, 5
937, 946 (D. Conn. 1975).
579 F.2d 1175 (9th Cir. 1978).
U.C.C. § 2-708 (1978) provides:
(1) Subject to subsection (2) and to the provisions of this Article with respect to proof of market price the measure of damages for non-acceptance or
repudiation by the buyer is the difference between the market price at the
time and place for tender and the unpaid contract price together with any incidental damages provided in this Article, but less expenses saved in consequence of the buyer's breach.
(2) If the measure of damages provided in subsection (1) is inadequate
to put the seller in as good a position as performance would have done then
the measure of damages is the profit (including reasonable overhead) which
the seller would have made from full performance by the buyer, together
with any incidental damages provided in this Article, due allowance for costs
reasonably incurred and due credit for payments or proceeds of resale.
Citations omitted.
164. U.C.C. § 9-504 (1978) provides in pertinent part:
(1) A secured party after default may sell, lease or otherwise dispose of
any or all of the collateral in its then condition or following any commercially
reasonable preparation or processing. Any sale of goods is subject to the Article on Sales (Article 2).
161.
CLSR
162.
163.

(3) . . . Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in
value or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market, reasonable notification of the time and place of any public sale or reasonable notification of
the time after which any private sale or other intended disposition is to be
made shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor, if he has not signed
after default a statement renouncing or modifying his right to notification of
sale. In the case of consumer goods no other notification need be sent. In
other cases notification shall be sent to any other secured party from whom
the secured party has received (before sending his notification to the debtor
or before the debtor's renunciation of his rights) written notice of a claim of
an interest in the collateral. * * *
165. 579 F.2d at 1179.
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courts generally require the damaged party to take appropriate corrective action to minimize the harm done. If those steps have not
been taken, courts will disallow any claim for that portion of the
damages which occurred after the point in time that corrective steps
should reasonably have been taken.
For instance, the court in Clements Auto Company v. Service
Bureau Company166 reduced the purchaser's recovery by the
amount it should have mitigated its damages. 167 The court, however,
held that Clements was not required to mitigate damages until two
years after the contract was executed. 168 Once the plaintiff becomes
aware of the breach, and determines that there are one or more
courses of action he can pursue to diminish his loss, he is obliged to
pursue that course of action which will most effectively minimize his
damages. 16 9 This requirement is intended to prevent a party who is
damaged during the early stages of performance of a contract from
idly sitting by and incurring additional damages which could have
been avoided through corrective action within his control. Interestingly, the court in Carl Beasley Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs Corporation 170 held that even though the plaintiff was under a duty to
mitigate damages, the burden of proving that the plaintiff had failed
7
to do so was on the defendant supplier.' '
IX

"HELL OR HIGHWATER" CLAUSE

Once a vendor has leased a computer to a customer, the vendor
may wish to assign its rights in the lease to a third party. This is
particularly true where the vendor needs immediate cash and, in exchange, assigns the right to receive future rental payments under
the lease. If the lease is silent on the right of assignment, or
reserves that right to the lessor, the lessee has little recourse from
72
such an assignment.
166. 444 F.2d 169, 2 CLSR 143 (8th Cir. 1971).
167. Id. at 184-86 & 191, 2 CLSR 168-71 & 179.
168. Id. at 187, 2 CLSR 173.
169. Since the purpose of the rule concerning damages is to put the injured
party in as good a position as he would have been put by full performance of
the contract at the least necessary cost to the defendant, the plaintiff is never
given judgment for damages for losses that he could have avoided by reasonable effort without risk of other substantial loss or injury.
5 A- CORBIN, CoNTRAcTs § 1039, at 241 (1960). "It is not infrequently said that it is the
'duty' of the injured party to mitigate his damages so far as that can be done by reasonable effort on his part." Id. at 242.
170. 361 F. Supp. 325, 4 CLSR 523 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
171. Id. at 334, 4 CLSR at 539.
172. Unless otherwise agreed all rights of either seller or buyer can be assigned except where the assignment would materially change the duty of the
other party, or increase materially the burden or risk imposed on him by his
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Once the lessee has accepted the equipment and the lease has
been assigned, he usually cannot assert any claims for improper
performance against the third party assignee. This may seriously
impair the lessee's ability to assert any claims against the original
vendor. For example, in National Bank of North America v. Deluxe
Poster Company,l7 3 the lessee was having difficulty with a computer
system. The equipment was supplied by Odyssey Systems, who
later assigned its rights under the lease agreement to the plaintiff.
The defendant refused to pay the plaintiff because the system was
not performing properly. The court found that, since the defendant
had accepted the computer equipment, it could not assert any
claims against the plaintiff-assignee, but must assert any claims it
17 4
has against the original lessor of the equipment.
In Honeywell Information Systems, Inc. v. Demographic Systems, Inc.,l1h the court upheld Honeywell's attempted replevin of
computer equipment, where the defendant failed to make the required lease payments. In that case, the defendant contended that
the equipment failed to perform properly as justification for withholding payment. The defense was denied "where, as here, perform1 76
ance was not a condition of payment under the Agreements."'
This situation can be especially important where the lessee
could otherwise gain bargaining power by withholding payments to
the vendor to insure that corrective action is taken to repair a malfunctioning computer system. The courts have held that the rights
of the assignee are consistent with the provisions of UCC section 9206(1).177
contract, or impair materially his chance of obtaining return performance.
§ 2-210(2) (1972).
51 App. Div. 2d 582, 378 N.Y.S.2d 462, 6 CLSR 261 (1976).
Id. at 582, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 464, 6 CLSR at 263.
396 F. Supp. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
Id. at 275.
National Bank of North America v. Deluxe Poster Co., 51 App. Div. 2d 582, 582N.Y.S.2d 462, 464, 6 CLSR 261, 263 (1976). U.C.C. § 9-206(1) (1978) states:
Subject to any statute or decision which establishes a different rule for
buyers or lessees of consumer goods, an agreement by a buyer or lessee that
he will not assert against an assignee any claim or defense which he may
have against the seller or lessor is enforceable by an assignee who takes his
assignment for value, in good faith and without notice of a claim or defense,
except as to defenses of a type which may be asserted against a holder in due
course of a negotiable instrument under the Article on Commercial Paper
(Article 3). A buyer who as part of one transaction signs both a negotiable
instrument and a security agreement makes such an agreement.

U.C.C.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
83, 378
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X. CONCLUSION
The attorney faced with reviewing a contract involving computer
goods and services undoubtedly relies upon experience gained in
drafting contracts for other types of goods or services. Unfortunately, the computer system which is not designed properly, or
which malfunctions, can cripple or even destroy a business. This
fact requires that both businessmen and attorneys examine more
closely both the computer system, and the contract terms being offered by the vendor.
Similarly, the vendor who wishes to protect himself from liability for faulty computer systems is well advised to re-examine the
heretofore acceptable "standard" contract provisions in light of the
cases that have been litigated in this area. Since the vendor continues to be characterized as the "expert," vis-a-vis the purchaser, the
conduct and representations of the vendor's sales staff should also
be re-evaluated in an effort to diminish possible exposure to liability. If any trend in this area is discernable, it is that the courts will
continue to resolve ambiguities or problems in contract drafting in
favor of the purchaser, since the purchaser does not typically possess the technical expertise of the vendor.

